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ment to be recordable." But this substantial compliance test
does not shed light on West Virginia's view, because these cases
involved claims of some defect in the acknowledgment itself, not
the questioning of an acknowledgment because the instrument
acknowledged was altered. Such a case, then, would be one of first
impression before the West Virginia court.
The principal case shows that an immaterial alteration of a
deed is one leaving the legal effect unchanged, but the case seems
contrary to the weight of authority in its implications that a
re-execution or redelivery was needed subsequent to the immaterial
change to bind the parties to the deed. The principal case also
raises a problem that might be troublesome in the future concerning
the effect of this recorded instrument as constructive notice to
third parties. The majority view would probably consider any
reacknowledgment unnecessary, that the original execution and delivery are valid and binding on the parties to the deed, and that
the original acknowledgment is similarly binding on third parties.
The court in the principal case points out the second oral acknowledgment by the grantor. However, as was noted, the finding that
there was no material alteration of the deed made the discussion of
this second oral acknowledgment pointless. In finding that the
deed was effective with the original signature, the court implied
that the original acknowledgment was also valid. The deed, then,
was completely valid and effective in its altered form.
Robert Brand Stone

Pleading-Alternative Methods of Changing Theory of
Action on Appeal
P, buyer of a mobile home, brought an action to rescind a purchase contract because of defects in the floor. D, (dealer) in turn
initiated a third party complaint against D- (manufacturer). The
Court of Common Pleas rendered judgments in favor of P against
D and in favor of D, against the third party D,. The circuit court
reversed both judgments and entered judgments in favor of D,
23 In re Atlantic Smokeless Coal Co., 103 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. W. Va.
1952); Blake v. Hollandsworth, 71 W. Va. 387, 76 S.E. 814 (1912).
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against P and in favor of D- against Di. Held, affirmed. Since P
kept the property for a prolonged period of time, treating it as
acceptable and maldng payments on it, he waived his right to
rescind. If P had a cause of action, it was for damages for breach
of warranty. Shreve v. Casto Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Monarch Indus.,
Inc., 149 S.E.2d 238 (W.Va. 1966).
In the principal case the Supreme Court of Appeals did not
decide whether P had a cause of action. There is, however, considerable federal case law to support the proposition that a plaintiff
with a good cause of action may be allowed recovery even though
he brings his action on the wrong theory. Rule 54(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a party is to be
granted any relief to which he is entitled even though he has not
demanded it.'
In Kowalewski v. Pennsylvania R.R.,2 Judge Rodney
stated: "The legal rights of the plaintiff are to be determined by
the law and the facts established in the case, and not by some
language in the claim."3 And in Nester v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
the court held as follows:
Under the liberal rules of the reformed procedure, a plaintiff is entitled to recover, not on the basis of his allegations
of damages or of his theory of damages, but on the basis of
the facts as to damages shown in the record. This liberality
is carried over into the nev rules [Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure].... [T]he plaintiff should be denied relief only
when, under the facts proved, he is entitled to none.
Had the court in the principal case made a specific finding that
P had a right to recover for breach of warranty, the federal lead
in the preceding cases could have been followed. However, it
would seem that the duty on the court to allow such a recovery
lies not as heavy as the duty on the plaintiff to bring to the
court's attention the facts and the law supporting such a recovery.
This the plaintiff can do by a motion to amend, when necessary,
and, as will be shown later, this amendment may change the
theory of the action.
The record in the principal case does not reveal that P requested
leave to amend his complaint at any stage in the proceedings.
' Gins v. Mauser Plumbing Supply Co., 148 F.2d 974, (2d Cir. 1945).
2

141 F.Supp. 565 (D. Del. 1956).

1Id. at 569.
425 F.Supp 478, 481 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
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This is significant in view of the fact that judgment was rendered
against him because his action in contract for rescission did not
lie. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated in the
decision that an action for breach of warranty might be proper.
Yet this is of little consolation to P. His only apparent recourse at
this point would be to institute another action. As a result, a
plaintiff might be denied recovery in a second action even though
he might have recovered a judgment in the first action if he bad
chosen the correct theory, i.e., he may be barred by res judicata or
even by the statute of limitations.
Had P sought to amend the complaint in this case, the question
arises concerning how late this should have been allowed, and
particularly, at what stage might he have been granted leave to
change his "cause of action." One may argue that P had the opportunity to choose the theory on which he intended to recover,
and that he must win or fail on that theory.' However, the federal
courts, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which are to be
liberally construed, have for the most part rejected this idea.6
Numerous federal cases, which will be discussed later, give
strength to the idea that a plaintiff may be allowed to change
his "cause of action" at any time, before judgment or afterward."
If the appellate court decides that the plaintiff should be
allowed to amend and make such a change, there are various ways
by which this may be accomplished. First, the appellate court
may allow such an amendment on its own.8 This would eliminate
the necessity of remanding to the lower court. It would be in line
with the spirit of the federal rules, being the most direct means
to reaching a just result.
Secondly, although no case directly in point has been found,
it would seem that the appellate court may also remand the case
to the trial court with directions that the trial court hear a motion
to change the theory of action by amendment. Certainly the
higher court can remand directing the trial court to hear a motion
to amend. In Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman-Kodak Co.,9 the court
- This concept was known as the "theory of the pleadings" doctrine.
6
"Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have done away with the narrow
'theory of pleadings' doctrine." Nord v. McIlroy, 296 F.2d 12, 14 (9th
Cir. 1961).
WThese cases are in line with a liberal construction of Rule 15(b) of the
West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, which rules are patterned after and
in most instances identical with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
83 MooRE, FEDERAL PascrscE § 15.13(2), at 985, 989 (2d ed. 1964).
9 228 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961).
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said: 'Tlaintiff urges that . . . we should state that affirmance is
without prejudice to the District Court's entertaining an application to amend. We have the power to do that even at this late
stage."'0 And in a Maryland case, before the mandate was
issued, the plaintiff petitioned the court of appeals to modify its
opinion by striking out the affirmance of the judgment for costs
and in lieu thereof to remand the case if it should appear to the
court that the "purposes of justice will be advanced by permitting
further proceedings."" This was done. Upon such a remand, the
discretion of the trial court governs the allowance or disallowance
of an amendment, and one may argue that the trial court, having
been granted the right to hear a motion to amend, is free to
exercise a wide discretion in this matter, as long as there have
been no specific restrictions from the higher court.' 2
A third alternative open to the appellate court would be to
remand to the lower court with leave to the plaintiff to amend his
theory of action.'3 This removes the question of amending from
the discretion of the trial court.
The importance of remanding in cases such as these lies in
the fact that the plaintiff is still in court, and thus avoids the
defenses available in a new action. But a caveat should be sounded
in cases where the court merely remands, and says nothing in
regard to amendments. The plaintiff may be allowed to amend
and present new issues with the lower court's consent." However,
there is substantial case law to the contrary, stating in effect that
the mandate of the appellate court must authorize the lower court
to hear a motion to amend before it can do so.'"
At any rate, the previously mentioned cases indicate a trend in
the federal courts to allow amendments freely, even at the appellate
stage, and even though this entails a change in the "cause of
action." However, at this stage an amendment may not raise
issues which have not been raised in the proceedings at any prior
I°Od. at 88.
" Fletcher v. Havre De Grace Fireworks Co., 229 Md. 196, 203, 183
A.2d 386, 388 (1962).
12 Canister Co. v. Leahy, 191 F.2d 255, 257 (3d. Cir. 1951); SheridanWyoming Coal Co. v. Krug, 172 F.2d 282, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
" Bryan v. Austin, 354 U.S. 933 (1957).
14 Jones v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 108 F.2d 123, 125 (5th
Cir. 1939).
Is Ginsburg v. Stem, 242 F.2d 379, 381 (3d Cir. 1957).
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stage. "Where, however, the appellate court finds that the case
was impliedly tried below on a theory not expressed in the
pleadings, it may allow an amendment on appeal to incorporate
such theory."' 6
The principal case offers no guidelines with respect to the
amendment issue or recovery on a different theory. The question
was not before the court. When the situation does arise, the court
may choose to reject a liberal construction of the West Virginia
Rules as applied to amendments. However, it seems it should
make every effort to decide a case on the merits. ' And if this
be the goal, one may assume that the court will follow the federal
lead in construing Rule 15(b) in such a manner as to "do substantial justice."1 8
Fred L. Fox, II

Public Utllities---What Constitutes a Public Utility in West Virginia
D, according to privately negotiated contracts, was to deliver
gas from its wells and neighboring wells in Barbour County via
its own pipeline to X and Y, two large Harrison County industrial
firms, already being served by C Gas Company, a public utility.
Acting upon a complaint filed by C, the Public Service Commission
of West Virginia ordered D to discontinue operations until it
applied for and received a certificate of public convenience and
necessity, a prerequisite to a public utility service.' Upon petition
for judicial review, held, reversed. D, serving only X and Y in
accordance with the privately negotiated contracts and with no
present intention to serve others, was not holding itself out to serve
the public and, therefore, was not a public utility. Wilhite v. Public
Serv. Commn, 149 S.E.2d 273 (W. Va. 1966).
The principal case presents the board inquiry as to what is a
public utility, and particularly, whether a company transporting
gas via its own pipeline to private customers falls within the definiFExDmtAL Pn~ccE § 15.11, at 967 (2d ed. 1964).
United States Fid. and Guar. Co. v. Eides, 144 S.E.2d 703, 710
(W. Va. 1965).
16
17

3 Moomn,

18 W. VA. R. CIV. P. 1.
I W. VA. CoDE oh. 24, art. 2,

§ 11 (Michie 1966).
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